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Abstract:
Multiple-pillar retirement systems have widely differing roles for private retirement
savings, government regulation and insurance of private savings vehicles, and government
provision of old-age income suppon. Despite their diversity, and despite the fact that public and
private sector retirement systems command a great deal of wealth and have potentially powerful
effects on labor and capital markets, they are often overlooked in structural analyses of country
problems and prospects.
This paper examines impottant institutional features of retirement systems in developed and
developing countries, and outlines what is known about their economic effects. Also identified are
ways in which public and private retirement systems affect the process of economic adjustment,
with special attention to the costs and benefits of encouraging early retirement
The review shows that a coherent reform plan for a retirement system must identify how
much old-age income security is affordable, how the government and private sector can address
private market failures in providing this security, and how these objectives can be attained given
available financing mechanisms. There is evidence that many retirement systems will be forced to
change a great deal in the next few decades. In some cases, retirement benefits will have to be
reduced (perhaps by imposing a means test), the age for early retirement will have to be raised,
multiple-pillar plans must be integrated and streamlined so as to rationalize work incentives, and
the incentives and opponunities for private saving will be increased. In any case, using high-cost
long-term retirement systems to mitigate shon- and medium-term unemployment problems will
probably prove costly and inefficient as a solution to problems faced by economies in transition.
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There are more persons over age 65 living today than at any previous moment in the
world's history, and their numbers are growing. Among the industrialized nations that are
members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), there is one
person 65 years of age or older for each five persons age 15 to 64, and the dependency ratio will
increase rapidly over the next few decades.1 Despite longer life expectancies and no evidence of
deterioration in health prof1les among most older workers, early retirement is becoming
increasingly common. The cost of supporting retirees is climbing: public retirement systems
amount to about 10 percent of national income, and make up 20 percent of total government
expenditure in most developed nations (see Table 1). As the new century dawns, it seems clear
that public retirement systems along with their private-sector counterpartS will be increasingly
called on to support the world's aging population.
Although public and private sector retirement systems command a great deal of wealth and
have potentially powerful effects on labor and capital markets, they are often overlooked in
Stnlctural analyses of country problems and prospects. This paper examines important institutional
features of retirement systems in the developed world as well as in several developing nations, and
outlines what is known about their economic effects. Also identified are ways in which public and
private retirement systems affect the process of economic adjustment, with a special focus on the
costs and benefits of encouraging early retirement for older workers affected by Stnlctural
adjustment.
Retirement systems differ across nations. Sometimes a publicly-provided old-age pension
is the primary component of retirement security, while in other countries, individual, company,
and family sources comprise older generations' main source of support. Institutional rules
regarding benefit levels, and the manner in which these benefits are financed, differ tremendously
across countries. These structural differences imply that the economic effects of retirement
systems vary greatly from one country to another.
Despite these differences, the retirement systems of most developed nations, and
increasingly developing economies as well. confront a number of common problems. In the years
to come, most nations will experience population aging, high unemployment rates, and shifts in
economic stnlcture. These pose new challenges for retirement systems, and may require
fundamental reforms in both benefit fonnulas and financing approaches. An understanding of how
existing retirement systems work, or sometimes fail to work, offers valuable lessons for the future.
No country would wish to simply import another nation's model in toto. Nevertheless. it is useful
to identify successful experiences to be emulated, and unsuccessful experiments to be avoided.
Better understanding of what makes for efficient and equitable retirement systems that can meet the
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changing demographic and economic needs of future generations of workers and retirees will be
invaluable for both developed nations and economies in transition.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section A briefly reviews recent trends toward early
retirement, and evaluate explanations for these trends. Institutional characteristics of retirement
systems are discussed in Section B. which introduces the notion of "multiple-pillars" for retirement
income security including government, employer. and individual/family support. Of central
interest are pension coverage and benefit patterns. as well as funding and investment practices.
Section C presents a discussion of the economic effects of retirement systems on labor and capital
markets. Conclusions. policy options. and research needs for policymakers offering economic
assistance to economies in transition are enumerated in the final section.
A. Retirement Patterns and Flows
This section presents data on recent trends toward early retirement, and evaluates several
explanations for these trends. One of the most important change in industrialized nations' labor
markets over the last two decades was a massive movement to early retirement. There is support
for the view that the trend toward earlier retirement was facilitated and strongly motivated by
factors which made it possible for older workers to leave their main jobs. including public and
private pensions. as well as other income suppon programs. This long downward trend in lifetime
work comes despite longer life expectancies in many developed nations, and without any evidence
of system-wide deterioration in health. How retirement systems have contributed to this long-term
downward trend in work at older ages is examined in the next Section.
Trends to Earlier Retirement
Derming what constitutes "retirement" differs not only from nation to nation. but from one
person to the next In many developed nations. a transition to retirement is taken to mean the point
where one accepts a public pension; this may or may not coincide with labor force withdrawal. In
Sweden for example. many retirees are partially employed after accepting a public pension, while
in the United States pension acceptance and work cessation are virtually synonymous (Fields and
Mitchell1984b). In other countries, accepting a privately-provided retirement payment, rather than
a public pension. constitutes retirement; in Japan, for instance. many workers retire from their
career job with a lump sum pension. and often move to some other. usually lower paying
employment. for several years (Rebick 1993).
Yet a different view of what constitutes retirement is garnered by surveys of older persons
who "self-report" their retirement status using any definition they wish; usually such surveys
produce higher rates of retirement than objectively defined measures which equates retirement with
complete labor force withdrawal. Additionally. retirement is not an absorbing state in many
nations. in that many older persons move fluidly between full and pan-time wage jobs. self
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employment, unemployment, leisure activities, and perhaps in some countries work in the "grey"
or "underground" economy.2
These different definitions of retirement are more than semantic, since alternative measures
produce very distinct estimates of the size of the country's actual and potential labor force. In
general, labor economists prefer to define retirement using an objective labor force participation
measure, in lieu of a self-reported definition or one which relies on pension acceptance. Even
here, however, there are cross-country differences in the defmition oflabor force participants
making these so-called more objective measures less than fully comparable across nations. Thus in
the fonner West Gennany, older persons became eligible for a special unemployment benefit after
being jobless for a specified time; on accepting this special benefit, they were removed from the
official unemployment count, and were thereafter excluded from the labor force count (Kohli et ale
19(1). Elsewhere, as in the United States, older workers are not privy to a special unemployment
subsidy and are thus more likely to be included in labor force statistics as long as they seek work.
Which specific retirement concept is used is also important for policy reasons, and the
concepts of most interest may depend on which policy concern is preeminent. Analysts concerned
with a pension plan's funding status will tend to focus on the age of pension acceptance for the
pwpose of predicting benefit outflows. In contrast, labor force measures (e.g. labor force
participation or hours of work) may be more useful in determining whether tax collections will be
sufficient to meet pension financing needs. Analysts focusing on alleviation ofpoveny in old age
will wish to know not only older persons' labor force status in the wage labor market, but might
also wish to examine whether income is generated by self-employment, and the employment and
earnings status of other family members.
While no single retirement concept is appropriate for all policy matters, the best data for the
countries of central interest to this study are labor force participation rates for older persons.
Hence a brief examination of these is useful, with the caveat that cross-country comparisons may
be somewhat inaccurate, as compared to within-country time series labor force participation
patterns.
Retirement Trends in the DECD: Labor force participation rates of older individuals
are by no means unifonn across the developed countries (see Table 2). For example, only 4
percent of the men age 65 and older were in the labor force in 1985 in the Netherlands, while in
Japan as many as 37 percent participated. Similar cross-national differences are observed for men
age 55-64, with rates of 19 percent in Austria, and 76 percent in Sweden.
Despite persistent long-run differences in ~ of laborforceparticipationaaoss
countries, there has been a common downward 1l'md in men's participation in developed nations
since World War II. This persistent long-run labor market trend was widespread across developed
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nations through the mid 1980s and is one of the most striking labor market developments in the last
half-century. These trends translate directly into earlier retirement ages: for instance. in the United
States. twenty years ago men retired at age 65 on average. and now,the average retirement age is
~ (Ippolito 1986).
The general downward trend in market participation which characterized older men was
also seen among older women across the OECD countries. but in a muted form. Participation rate
trends of older women are more difficult to summarize because many women entered the paid labor
market only relatively recently. and have not accumulated enough years of service to retire with a
pension plan in their 50's. Hence institutional factors no doubt provide an incentive for women to
remain on the job at older ages. which offsets the general trend to earlier retirement predominant
for males. As is evident from Table 2. women's market participation rates among those over age
65 have remained quite low across the OECD nations, and the slow change among those aged 55-
64 reflects both positive and negative influences on retirement patterns.
As a whole. the data show that fewer and fewer older persons are working for pay in
developed nations. This trend is particularly striking in view of the fact that life expectancies in
most of these countries have been rising in the last fifty years, and health problems for people in
their 50s and 60s are, at the very worst, no more serious than they were fifty years ago (Baily
1987). Earlier retirement is therefore increasingly the norm. despite the fact that people are now
living longer in the retirement pericxl.3
Retirement Trends in 'Transition Economies' : Tracking retirement trends is more
difficult in the transition economies, which here are taken to mean Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Republics. These countries share some retirement system problems with those nations in
Asia. Latin America and Africa conventionally included in the developing countty group. Time
series are less readily available, surveys tend to be less comparable, and the meaning of labor force
participation rates is less clear when large segments of the population are engaged in subsistence
farming and related activities. Also older workers' health patterns tend to be worse in the
developing nations. For example a recent survey of older workers' health status in Hungary
pointed out that life expectancies have actually declined over the last several decades in that
countty, and the incidence of occupational illness is far higher.4
Because of these caveats. about the most that can be said is that there is a great deal of
cross-countty variation in participation rates for older workers in transition economies, as can be
detelmined by an examination of the data from Table 3. Labor force participation rates of older
pt'l'SOnstend to be higher here than the average for developed nations: for instance, in Poland 33
percent of the men age 65+ were in the labor force at the end of the 1980s, as compared to rates
below 10 percent in France and Italy. A notable outlier is Hungary where only 3-4 percent of men
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and women age 65+ are employed. Only in Poland is a trend identifiable. and here too it seems to
be downward. particularly for the younger age groups (age 55-64).
Explaining Earlier Retirement
What explains this trend toward earlier retirement? One widely held view emphasizes
factors forcing or "pushing" workers out of their jobs. while the opposing perspective contends
that "pull" factors attract older workers into retirement (International Labor Office 1989; Kohli et
al.I991). This distinction is obviously somewhat arbitrary. since for example the onset of poor
health can "push" a worker out of his job. but also can make leisure more attractive thus "pulling"
that worker into retirement. Despite this caveat. it is useful to classify evidence on these two
hypotheses for descriptive purposes.
Evidence on the ''push'' hJPothesis : This theory holds that people truly wish to
remain employed at older ages. but are forced from their jobs by declining productivity and poor
health. mandatory retirement and age discrimination. and structural shifts in labor demand
-Productivity and Health: Many believe that productivity falls and employee health
deteriorates with age. leading employers to force out older employees when health problems strike.
Indeed, many surveys report that when people are asked why they retire. poor health is a common
response.S Nevertheless. it is difficult to measure the independent effects of health problems on
older persons' work behavior, and in many countries people feel it is socially acceptable to retire
because of poor health. as compared to saying that "they got tired of working". Furthermore. as
shall be shown below, many countries offer income-support maintenance programs which require
the applicant repon he or she cannot work. It has been suggested. therefore, that at least some
older people reply that they are in poor health as an ex-post rationalization for retiring at relatively
young ages (Fields and Mitchell 1984b; Sammartino 1987).
Good-quality evidence is difficult to obtain on the effect of poor health on retirement On
the one hand we know that people retire earlier from physically demanding jobs. from jobs where
they are exposed to heavy machinery and equipment, and from jobs with extremes of temperature.
stress. and other unpleasant working conditions (Gustman and Steinmeier 1986; Mitchell 1990).
On the other hand, these jobs also tend to offer above average pensions. so earlier retirement may
be due to pension opponunities rather than because the workers are forced out There is little
suggestion that on-the-job accidents and injury rates rise with age in the United States: work
accidents are lower for older than for younger employees. but little is known about patterns in
Other countries.6
As yet there is little evidence to suppon or to refute the view that worsening health and
productivity problems among older persons explains trends toward earlier retirement in the set of
developed countries. If anything. most older persons in developed nations are probably living
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longer and in probably as good health (if not better) as compared to previous decades.' In
developing countries, by contrast, this conclusion may not hold since urbanization in many
developing countries sometimes exposes people to more disease, Pollution, and risk of injury than
in wealthier economies.
-Mandatory retirement and age discrimination: Retirement research over the last decade
casts serious doubt on the view that age discrimination and mandatory retirement rules explain
observed early retirement trends in developed countries. To summarize the labor economics
argument, long-tenn compensation contracts with upward-sloping pay profiles are often used as a
means of spurring worker productivity and ensuring long tenure. Ex ante, a long-term contract
specifies that an employee will leave the firm at the point when his total compensation comes to
exceed his total productivity (Lazear 1979; Gustman et a1. 1992). From this perspective, the age of
mandatory retirement plays a central and valuable role: it is the pre-agreed point at which the labor
contract comes to an end, after which the employee would be overpaid relative to his value to the
firm. Hence mandatory retirement is rationalized as an economically important phenomenon,
rather than as evidence of employer age bias without economic rationale.
The hypothesis that mandatory retirement demarcates the end of a long tenn labor contract
is supponed in several research studies. In the U.S. for instance, individual companies (and
unions) were originally pennitted to set mandatory retirement ages until a recent change in federal
policy outlawed the practice. After the law was changed, companies responded by developing
alternative inducements for retirement, including pension incentives and special early retirement
"window" plans.8 In Japan many firms retire workers on attaining a retirement age, but do not
necessarily require that older workers drop out of the labor force -- inst~ many Japanese
employers re-mre these older workers (at lower pay) rather than forcing them out of their finns
altogether (Rebick 1993; Clark 1992). This fact suggests that mandatory retirement plays the role
of endpoint in a long tenn employment contract, rather simple age discrimination.
Can mandatory retirement policy account for the entire trend to earlier retirement over time,
in developed countries and perhaps in some developing countries? Here the answer is probably no.
Even in the United States when retirement policy was in the firms' jurisdiction until recently, most
older workers appear not to have been constrained by mandatory retirement -- the vast majority of
workers left their jobs well prior to the age they would have been "forced out", and continued to do
10 after the government lifted the mandatory retirement age altogether. While mandatory retirement
ages clearly played different roles in different countries and times, it is certain that mandatory
mU-ement policy cannot explain all of the long-tenn decline in labor force participation rates aroong
workers in their 50's and 60's.
Page 7 - Olivia S. Mitchell
Even if mandatoryretirementis not binding on mostolder workers.it may bethat thereis
agediscrimination in hiring limiting older workers'job opportunities. To establishtheprevalence
of age discrimination. it is necessaryto determine whether emplo>:erstreat equally productive
workers less generously simply becauseof age. Direct evidence on this point is scanty, in part
becauseof thedifficulty of holding workerproductivity constantwhile comparingemployers'pay,
hiring practices, layoff and firing patterns, and the like. Some researcherscontend age
discrimination in employment is quite widespread. a deduction basedon survey evidence showing
that many retirees report that they wish to work.9 This conclusion requires a caveat, however,
since a self-reponed interest in employment does not imply actual willingness to seek and take a
job, nor does it reflect potential productivity. In the United States, a recent study found that only 9
percent of nonworking men age 55-65 and 18 percent over age 65 reponed that they could not
work because of lack of opportunity. For women, the figures were higher - 26 percent of the 55-
64 year old female nonworkers, and 11 percent of those age 65 and over (Fields and Mitchell
1984b). These figures suggest that a fairly small percentage of those who want to find work
actually report that they are stymied for job market reasons. Further examination of survey
responses by those nonworkers who indicate they might like to work, also reveals that they have
restrictive and in many cases quite unrealistic perceptions of their labor market opportunities. That
is, many have only a very narrow set of jobs and wage levels they are willing to accept, and would
not take jobs requiring strenuous working conditions or long commuting distances
(Commonwealth Fund 1990).
A different insight into older persons' job market opportunities comes from information on
joblessness and job finding after plant shutdowns. Older persons displaced from their jobs due to
plant shutdownsin the U.S. apparentlydo have amoredifficult time rIDdingnew work, as
comparedto youngeremployeesdisplacedfrom the samerlI'lllS.Further, when they do obtain
employment, their earnings are somewhat lower than younger persons. However older workers,
after being displaced, appear more likely to remain in their same industry/occupation, as compared
to their younger counterparts. 10 Whether this illustrates employer bias, or employee reluctance to
undertake investments such as skill acquisition and migration, is not yet known. Additional
studies on other countries' experiences are needed to examine this problem in more depth.
.Structural Shifts in Labor Demand: Still another explanation for why older workers'
labor market attachment has declined in the last two decades is that older workers may lack
computer skills, or their human capital may have depreciated so much, that they are passed over in
faVor'of other more productive inputs. In other words, older workers may suffer disproportionate
job loss as a result of a shift in the economic composition of jobs, due in part to strUCturalshifts
and in part to technological change.
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Direct tests of this hypothesis have been hampered by the difficulty of measuring structural
shift and technological obsolescence, and direct measures of the degree of substitutability between
older and younger workers (and capital) are rare.ll Evidence shows, however, that the tIend
toward earlier retirement in Europe and the U.S has not been concentrated in sectors experiencing
the most economic growth, nor those experiencing the largest declines. Ins~ earlier retirement
has characterized most if not all the major industrial sectors, suggesting that this argument is less
potent than at first it might seem (Jacobs et al. 1991a and b; Pampel and Weiss 1983).
Evidence on the "pull" hypothesis: An alternative explanation for the trend to earlier
retirement is that many older workers leave employment because they value leisure and home time
strongly. Overtime, factors which permit, if not encourage, older workers to withdraw from the
wage labor market have become more important, particularly retirement income levels, and
retirement income incentives. Income levels are detennined by public and private pensions, family
support, and other assets available during retirement Retirement incentives are determined by
comparing the utility of additional income received as a result of continued work offset by less
leisure or time spent at home, with the utility of retirement activities and any pension or other
benefits receivable after retirement
-The Role of Economic Factors: Research over the last decade has demonstrated that
economic factors prove to be an extremely important detenninant of the retirement decision. Never
the less a precise measure of their effects is available for only a few countries.12 In the United
States, for example, economic factors appear to account for about 75 percent of explained variation
in retirement ages, as compared to health factors which account for only 25 percent. These
economic factors include wage earnings while employed, and private pension as well as Social
Security payments when retired. Such financial factors have two offsetting effects, however,
which must be clearly distinguished. First, economists emphasize that workers with more
retirement income retire earlier, whether it is from public or private sources. Second, there is a
complex interaction between income and substitution effects which occurs when workers are
offered more income to delay retirement Existing evidence on men suggests that for a reasonable
range of policy changes, the substitution effect tends to overcome the income effect In other
words, for men, raising the reward for deferring retirement tends to induce some delay in the
retirement age.
Having said that earnings and pension opportunities matter, it should be emphasized that
the particular institutional details of public and private retirement programs must be understood in
order to evaluate how older workers adapt their work patterns in response to retirement systems.
Thus, for instance, the Swedish public pension system permits a worker to accept his pension
annuity and remain employed part-time, a practice which produces higher employment rates among
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older Swedes as compared to virtually any other Western European nation. In the United States, in
contrast, retirees earning above an annual threshold amount have their social security pension
reduced by one-half to two-thirds, and pay income tax on a portio~ of remaining benefits; panIy as
a result of these restrictions, labor supply among the elderly in the US is quite low.
Clearly retirement systems can and do affect work incentives at older ages. This is best
seen by noting that when retirement is delayed, additional pay (and ultimately later pension
benefits) is earned, and then must be compared with the benefits foregone by an additional year of
work. H returns from work drop sharply at a particular age, such as in Japan when workers attain
the mandatory retirement age, the "pull" of the pension may be enough to induce early retirement
(Rebick 1993). This calculation also depends on the specific pension rules in place: that is, a
benefit reduction factor is often used to lower the retiree's monthly pension benefit if he elects to
retire early, on the grounds that the early commencement of monthly payments makes the present
value of the lifetime benefit paid equal in actuarial terms to the regular, higher benefit (the lower
benefit for early retirement is received over a longer period of time).
Evaluating pension incentives for different retirement ages thus requires one to compare the
present value of (net) benefit streams at all feasible retirement ages. Thus for instance, a pension
plan which pays "full" benefits at age 65 would be actuarially neutral if it reduces benefits by about
SOpercent for an age-55 retiree -- in present value terms, the age-55 and the age-65 benefits would
be roughly equal.13 Many public sector employers and the majority of private sector pension
plans, are not neutral, however, at times strongly subsidizing early retirement by offering
payments of 75 or even 100 percent of the age-65 benefit for those leaving early (Fields and
Mitchell 1984b; Leonesio 1993). In contrast, the Japanese national retirement system has the
opposite feature, paying only 58 percent of the full benefit for someone retiring at age 60, instead
of the higher benefit, around 70 percent, which would make pension wealth and work incentives
neutral (Myers 1991).
Plans are sometimes influential in work decisions at later ages as well, such as when work
beyond the "nonnaI" retirement age yields benefit increases which are too small, or too large, to be
acnwially neutral. Penalties for continued work beyond the normal retirement age occur when a
plan offers benefit enhancements which do not offset the now-shoner retirement period. This is
quite common among private sector plans in the United States, where continued work afta' age 65,
and sometimes even after age 60, is often penalized (Luzadis and Mitchell 1991). In contrast,
social security retirement pension rules in the United States are roughly actuarially neutral for those
working beyond age 65, while in Japan, work between the ages of 65 and 70 yields benefits
higher by 88 percent instead of the more actuarially neutral 40 percent (Myers 1991). These
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retirement system incentives influence workers' decisions about when to retire. and must be a
central focus of those seeking to alter retirement patterns and trends.
It shou1dalso be noted that in many countries private and public pension systems interact in
such a way that benefit formuJas include cascading or cumulative effects on retirement
incentives,14 Furthermore. as has been recognized in a few recent studies of retirement trends in
Western Europe. the availability of other. non-pension income transfer programs also interacts
closely with the pension schemes to influence the relative appeal of retirement at young ages. For
example. as will be discussed below. unemployment relief and disability benefit systems
sometimes offer alternative routes out of the workplace for persons seeking alternatives to the job
market Though existing studies are thus far mainly descriptive. they tend to suppon the view that
these other transfer programs have generated new pathways to retirement which to some extent
work outside the regular public and private pension systems.
Researchers are currently examining whether the long term trend toward early retirement
can be explained adequately by analyzing changes over time in pension plan characteristics and
formuJa-driven benefit reduction or increase factors. There is some evidence that these have. in
fact. played a powerful role. Incentives to retire early have strengthened in many nations over the
last four decades. and these benefit increases seem to .'track" declining labor supply patterns quite
closely. In a study using US aggregate data, Levine (1993) found that average social security
retirement benefits predicted men's labor force panicipation fairly well. and certainly much better
than a simple time trend would. More research is needed on this topic. particularly using
individual-level survey data now becoming available in many developed and developing
countries. IS
-other Factors: It shou1dbe emphasized that in some nations. older persons retire from the
paid labor market to engage not in leisure activities, but in self employment and/or home
production. In Hungary, for example. where large segments of the older population repon
working in agricu1ture, retirement has signified a change in industry and occupation - a movement
away from the state-run system to the non-socialist sector (Szalai 1991).
B. Retirement Systems in Practice
Over the last two decades, many nations have developed innovative policies influencing
retirement and work patterns, including (but not limited to) private and public pension systems. A
"traditional" motivation for this increased attention to retirement policy has been demographic aging
- there are increasing numbers of persons requiring old-age income support The population and
labor force estimates discussed above imply growing concern along this dimension. given expected
aging trends. A less traditional, but increasingly common, rationale for the new concern about
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retirement policy is the fact that many nations have been adapting their retirement systems in times
of slack labor demand, increasingly providing generous retirement payments in lieu of
unemployment payments.
"
Benefits and financing arrangements of retirement systems differ greatly across the set of
developed countries. as well as their reliance on private market provision. government regulation,
and government provision. Despite these differences, it appears that many nations have
increasingly relied on multiple-pillar systems to draw older workers out of the labor force. A
review of experience from developed countries shows that many public retirement systems made
early retirement financially attractive in the last decade. Such offerings included low early
retirement eligibility ages, generous pension and other benefit levels, and strong disincentives to
remain employed at older ages. High payroll tax rates also characterize many public retirement
plans.
Overview of Multi,ple-PillarRetirement Systems
It is useful to employ a common conceptual framework for comparing multiple pillar
retirement systems across countries. Following a brief overview of these systems, key benefit and
funding features of retirement systems are identified. including both public and private schemes.
Overall strengths and weaknesses of public versus private systems are then sketched. Specific
effects of retirement systems on labor and capital markets are taken up in the next section. 16
Most developed and developing countries have some fonn of old-age income support
systems. Nevertheless. they differ tremendously in structure and impact both within and across
countries, earning the designation of "multiple-pillar" systems. This concept reflects the fact that
old age support usually derives from a number of sources including public pensions (e.g. social
security retirement plans), private group mechanisms (e.g. company pensions), and family and
other private support (e.g. self-insurance, individual saving, children's support). The mix of plans
differs greatly across nations, and indeed in some cases different workers within a panicular
country may be covered by vastly different programs. Hence understanding multiple pillar
retirement systems requires learning a great deal about many diverse public and private pension
institutions, which vary greatly across countries and even within a country.
In addition to understanding pension institutions, it is important to point out that many
other public and private programs influence retirement, sometimes intentionally and other times
not. In many European countries. for instance, unemployment insurance and disability benefits
were offered during the 1980's as a form of subsidized early retirement, with the goal of permitting
employers to substitute younger workers for those older individuals who could then retire early,
and absorbing what were perceived as "redundant" older workers from the unemployment rolls.
These alternative paths to early retirement were widely used. Lenient eligibility rules produced
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higher disability rates in some countries such as the Netherlands. which had 1.033 disability
recipients per 1.000 labor force participants age 60-64. for example. while the United States had
only one-quarter as many (Kohli et aI. 1991; Burkhauser 1993). .
Key Features of RetirementSystems ,
Retirement systems in most countries are extremely complex. particularly when plans
interact and overlap to create an institutionally complex web of rules. In addition, multiple-pillar
systems behave differently depending on each country's specific mix of public and private
components. A brief description of the two most important aspects of retirement plans is offered to
aid in understanding how the many different approaches to retirement systems work: benefits and
financing. Instead of cataloging all possible retirement systems. the key characteristics common to
most plans are identified. making reference to individual country plans in selected instances.
Unless otherwise noted, specific country retirement system examples throughout this section are
taken from Tables 4 and 5 describing retirement system characteristics in OECD nations.
Regarding Benefits:
1. Retirement $ystem Coveraie Rules and Practice: Whom does a cOunJry'sretirement system
cover, and which groups are excluded by law or defacIOfrom participation?
In many countries, participation in a fonnal retirement system is restricted to citizens who
are wage and salary workers. and in some cases only fractions of the entire workforce are
covered17 At times, one tier of the retirement system is limited in coverage but other tiers are
unrestricted. Thus in Finland for instance. five years of residence suffice for coverage under the
basic public pension scheme which does not require citizenship. Japan, by contrast, allows only
resident citizens to be eligible for the basic pension plan, though residency is not required for a
second tier of employees' pension. As a result. coverage rates vary widely across countries. For
example in the United States. most private sector workers are covered by a public social security
pension system, but only about 45 percent by the private retirement system
Uneven coverage produces higher benefits for employees participating in national and
occupational systems. but may leave more vulnerable workers who are uncovered. Of particular
concern is the situation of immigrants who are often excluded from retirement plan coverage due to
panicipation rules requiring citizenship. These barriers to mobility will become increasingly
~trictive as the Western European job market opens up in the next decade, and may hamper labor
flows across the community of economies in transition. as they begin to experience more flexible
labor markets (Commission of the European Communities 1991).
In addition to national or occupational pension plans. retirement systems often include
private income support mechanisms. These can include benefits offered by labor ex'social
organizations, family groups. or even individual retirement savings accounts. Cross country
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differences in the private "pillar" of the multiple pillar system defy a common classification
scheme. Nevertheless. a careful analysis of the multiple aspects of a nation's retirement system
requires a full review of retiree income support offered by the private sector. IS
2. Retirement System Entitlement Requirements and Practice: What requirements must be met in
order to receive benefits. and what kinds of people can meet these requirementS?
Most formal pension plans require covered workers to be employed some minimum
number of years in order to be eligible for retirement benefits. though the range of eligibility
requirements is fairly wide and varies both within and across countries. Thus in the United States,
individuals must be employed in covered jobs for at least 10 years in order to be entitled to social
security pensions, whereas a maximum of 5 years of participation is typically required in order to
become entitled to private pension benefits. In other countries, employees must also fulfill a
certain number of years of work immediately prior to retirement; for example in New Zealand, 7
years of work within the 10 years before retirement are required for public pension benefit
entitlement, while in Spain a total of 10 years of coverage is required, including at least 5 years in
the 10 years immediately preceding retirement
Many countries also have special government, or mandated occupational, pension
programs covering particular industries or economic sectors. These generally require employment
for a specified number of years in that sector before a worker becomes entitled to benefits. For
example, many developed countries offer special pensions to public sector employees, military and
diplomatic personnel, miners. and farmers; a similar pattern of special pensions has existed in
many transition economies such as Hungary and Poland as well. These special plans frequently
offer more generous and earlier benefits than do the regular public and private retirement plans, and
their entitlement rules can make workers unwilling to change jobs for fear of losing or lowering
their pension. In assessing the way a retirement system works, then, it is important to distinguish
between coverage and benefit entitlement rules in formal retirement income programs.
3. Rules Governinf Benefit Elifibility and Receipt: What is required to receive retirement benefits,
and how do benefits change when workers retire early or late?
Most retirement programs specify that covered individuals attain a specified age, or age
plus service, in order to begin receiving "normal" benefit payments defined according to an
unreduced or "full" benefit formula. The normal retirement age varies across OECD nations and
even within countries: in the United States, for instance, it has been age 65 under the social
IeCU1itysystem but as young as age 55 in some private pension plans. In Japan, the public plan
requires age 65 for full benefits but many private plans pennit full benefits at age 60 (Tables 4 and
5). Looking across OECD countries, most public and private plans set their normal retirement age
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at 65 for men (the country weighted average is just over age 64) and somewhat earlier for women
(the public plan average is 62.5 and the private plan average is 59.7 years of age).
In line with the trend to earlier retirement noted above, workers frequently retire at ages
other than the normal age. Early retirement ages range from a low of 55 to 64 in public plans,
averaging between age 59 to 62. OECD country private pensions tend to allow even earlier
retirement, around age 55 as a rule. Those electing to retire prior to the normal retirement age
generally receive reduced annual benefits. Delayed retirement, which means retiring later than the
plan's specified normal age, frequently produces annual benefit amounts which exceed the normal
or full benefit.
Benefit eligibility rules also vary along other dimensions. Some countries have a means
test, and reduce or cut benefits to those with income, or assets, higher than a threshold, as in
Australia. Other countries have a work test, permitting benefit receipt only among those who have
little or no earnings. For example in the United States, older workers have their social security
retirement payments reduced by 50 percent if earnings exceed a threshold Such rules have the
effect of targeting retirement benefits on the needy, enhancing the welfare aspect of the plan and
reducing the earnings-replacement insurance aspect. They also tend to reduce work incentives for
those subject to the test.
Not all nations discourage work among the older population: for example Sweden
encourages its older citizens to remain employed under its partial retirement option, by allowing
older persons to work part time and continue receiving pension benefits. As a result, labor force
participation rates of older persons in Sweden are among the highest of the developed world. It
should also be noted that as benefits rise, and eligibility requirements become more restrictive
(including means tests), peoples' incentives to misrepresent their eligibility and/or degree of
disability increases, and this becomes particularly a problem when record keeping is less than
perfect.
4. Retirement Bent:fit Amounts: How are benefits determined, and how do they vary in different
s1lltes o/the economy? Are benejits real or nominal? How are benejitsfrom different programs
integrated, and how are these taxed?
Benefits received under a retirement system vary according to whether the plans offer
benefits according to a specified formula, or whether benefits are determined by contribution
amounts. Defined benefit plans are most typical of publicly provided retirement plans and, in most
countries, employer-sponsored plans as well. In such a plan, annual benefits are specified
according to a formula based on years of service and pay, and benefits are frequently tWO-tierin
nature: the first-tier is a flat or minimum pension, and the second tier focuses more closely on
earnings replacement. The relative importance of the first-tier flat benefit versus the second-tier
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earnings-based component varies from country to country. In Hungary, for instance, roughly
two-thirds of all retirees are said to be receiving only the minimum or welfare pension, while in
Canada and West Germany more emphasis was traditionally placed on earnings replacement
Defined benefit plans which emphasize minimum benefits tend to be more redistributive than the
earnings-based plans, though even in the latter some formulas cap the amount of earnings that can
be credited toward the retirement benefit, or the benefit replacement rate is strUCturedso as to
replace lower-paid workers' wages at a higher rate than higher-paid workers. As will be
demonstrated below, such benefit formulas have differential effects on work incentives for the
lower-paid and those earning more.
Dermed contribution plans, by contrast, specify not the benefit formula but rather the
amount to be contributed to the worker's account. The monies are then invested until retirement.
In this type of plan the worker bears investment risk since most defined contribution plans do not
guarantee a minimum pension nor a particular replacement rate on earnings. Since early retirement
spreads benefit receipt over a longer period of time, early retirement also requires actuarial
reduction of benefits. These reductions are large: for example, in the United States, an age-55
retiree with a defined contribution plan would receive about half the benefits of a worker retiring at
age 65 (McGill and Grubbs 1989). In contrast, many defined benefit plans subsidize early
retirement by paying early retirees more than half the normal benefit amount (Fields and Mitchell
1984a). Since subsidies discourage work incentives (see the next section), it is important for
analysts of a retirement system to determine whether and how the net present value of retirement
annuity flows vary with retirement age. An actuarially fair plan would be consistent with constant
net present value amounts as retirement is delayed.
Consideration of benefits under retirement systems also requires attention to how be~fits
respond to other considerations. One issue is how benefits are affected by inflation: some plans
partially or fully index payments, while many others do nol For example, retirees under the social
security system in the United States receive nominal increases as long as the inflation rate exceeds
3 percent (Tables 4 and 5). Canada and the United Kingdom offer indexed assets held by private
pension plans, which enhances benefit security of private pension holdings. In many other cases,
however, public and private retirement benefits erode in real value with iI)flation. Tax policy
toward benefits also varies: when benefits are subject to taxation, this reduces their net value and
hence their attractiveness. Integration of benefits across many plans is also very important, and
tIkes a variety of guises. One form of integration occurs when many programs are overlaid: thus
older workers may retire under one plan (e.g. a private or disability plan) and then transition to the
regular social security pension when the retiree is old enough. This has been panicularly important
in Western European nations where unemployment insurance and disability pensions were used
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during the 19808 to remove many older persons from the labor pooL A different kind of integration
arises when retirees' pension payments are reduced by other payments, such as disability or
workers' compensation systems. Last but not least, if benefits flu~te over time with the health
of the economy, or with demographic characteristics, these fluctuations will also affect older
workers' assessment of likely benefit security. Sometimes the government guaTantees minimum
benefits, which changes the risk characteristics of the retirement benefit promise considerably. For
example, in Clile the government continues to guarantee a minimum pension even though the
national pension system is a mostly-private mandatory national defined contribution system.19
Analysts examining how a retirement system affects economic behavior will typically
require a careful understanding of these benefit formulas and benefit eligibility rules in order to
carefully assess what retirement systems benefit promises are. In general, replacement rate
calculations are an inadequate method of summarizing benefit formulas and the complex structure
of the benefit promise. Nonetheless, many analysts refer to these as a summary statistic
representing benefit generosity. With appropriate caveats understood, the evidence shows that
public plan replacement rates across OECD nations stood at about 38 percent, and private plans
replaced about 60 percent of average pay (Tables 4 and 5).
Regarding Financing:
5. Payini for Retirement s..vstems: Are contributions mandalory or voluntary, who pays them, and
how do they vary in different states of the economy? If voluntary plans are available, do
contributions receive any special tax treatment? Ifmandatory taxes are collected, how do these
affect labor costs?
When retirement plans are mandated nationally, as in the case of social security systems
and some occupational pension schemes, they are often paid for with a payroll tax levied on wage
and salary workers (and sometimes on the self-employed). Tax rates vary widely across countries,
and are sometimes levied only on earned income up to a cap, which opens such retirement systems
to charges of regressivity. (On the other hand, such plans often do not recognize earnings above
the cap for the purposes of benefit computation, which lessens the force of this charge.) In
mandatory systems there is also the recurring policy concern that high payroll tax rates make labor
more expensive, inducing employers to either evade taxes by redefming pay in new ways, or to
substitute away from labor in favor of capital. If, in addition, there is an uncovered sector of the
labor force not subject to payroll taxes, employment can become concentrated in the uncovered
sector, with an offsetting decline in covered sector jobs. (Evidence on these points is offered in the
next section). Finally, in the case of mandatory retirement systems, there is the very difficult issue
of determining how mandated contributions chanse with the state of the economy. This is
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important in addressing whether retirement system contributions can be flexible enough to
guarantee promised benefits in slow economic times. and also in the long run as the population age
mix changes.
When a retirement scheme is voluntarily provided. it may be offered by employers.
worlcers and their labor groups. other social organizations. or a mix of these. Frequently
contributions to these accounts are negotiated in a collective agreement. and often national
governments encourage these accounts by granting them a tax-preferred status. Individual
retirement accounts have also been tried in some developed nations such as the United States.
where special tax breaks are available to those depositing funds in accounts directed toward
retirement savings. A full picture of the retirement system's multiple pillars requires assessing the
tax preferences granted to such accounts as well.
6. Retirement System Assets and Administrative Performance: How are contribUtions invested, if
it is afunded system, or is the system organized an pay-as-you-go arrangement? Is the retirement
system administratively efficient? How well does it manage its portfolio?
Nationally-run retirement plans are generally operated on a pay-as-you-io (PAYGO) basis.
which means that taxes collected in a given year are used to pay benefits in that year. Most national
plans are unfunded, though more rarely, national plans may be partly funded (which implies that
some of the taxes collected are invested rather than paid out immediately). Here too, however,
plan assets tend to fall short of the full amount needed to pay promised future benefits. In such
systems, benefits paid out often bear little relationship to taxes paid in, either for individuals or for
entire generations of participants.
A major rationale for PAYGO plans is that such systems are able to provide benefits to a
"start-up" or transition generation of retirees needing old-age income protection, who did not save
enough in advance to achieve retirement security. A related explanation is that an unfunded system
provides a support mechanism for a poor cohort. or poor members of a cohort. by future
generations of workers. Hence redistributional goals are often deemtd central to PAYGO
systems. Detractors of these systems argue that PAYGO systems have undesirable market effects,
mainly (1) reducing savings by substituting public indebtedness for privately-held retirement
capital, and (2) reducing labor supply by transferring wealth to relatively less well-off cohorts.
Evidence on these contentions is offered in the next section.
In contrast to PAYGO plans, funded retirement plans have contributions which are
invested, and eventual retirement benefits are then directly linked to asset perfonnance. Many
priVately provided pension plans are fully funded, by which is meant retirement benefits depend
directly on an actuarial division of the retiring workers' available asset pool. Po' example, in a
dermed contribution plan, each working generation pays contributions which are then invested in a
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well-diversified portfolio of financial instruments. As each cohort retires, it then receives the
expected present value of its portfolio in annuity form. Supporters of funded retirement plans
emphasize that (1) these plans offer old-age insurance without imposing redistribution across
generations, and (2) because funded plans generate savings, these plans have been said to increase
national saving and expand domestic capital markets. Detractors emphasize the lack of
redistribution present in these systems, and argue that funded systems may be risky when their
assets are subject to capital market fluctuations and political manipulation.
In the last decade an intermediate form of plan fundine has received a great deal of
attention, combining features of both funded and PAYGO systems. A much-discussed example is
found in the Chilean national defined contribution pension plan, which in 1981 replaced the
previous social security PAYGO system The Chilean plan is best viewed as an intermediate
system since, like a defined contribution plan, it required that worker contributions be invested in a
pension fund However, the government initially restricted fund investments to Chilean assets,
and mainly to government bonds, rather than requiring it to have an internationally diversified
ponfolio.20 In addition, the Chilean government continues to serve as guarantor of the system in
many ways, including the promise of a minimum benefit payable iIrespective of actual fund
performance. In the mid-1980s the government also bailed out the country's financial institutions,
including the national pension fund.
Irrespective of whether a retirement plan is PAYGO, fully funded, or in between, a well-
ron system should be administratively efficient Many nations have apparently suffered problems
in this regard, with negative rates of return characterizing many Latin American countries. Well
performing systems have been identified in which administrative costs total only one or two
percent of total collections, whereas other national systems are reported to spend up to 20 percent
on administrative costs.21 Data problems also plague many countries making the transition away
from a socialist system; for instance, earnings records are apparently unavailable in Hungary and
Poland despite the retirement system's need to link benefits with wage histories. In other countries
no data were kept on employees' years of coverage under the retirement system, making it almost
impossible to determine benefits. This clearly opens the possibility for fraudulent claims and
massive administrative inefficiencies.
Stren~hs and Weaknesses of Public and Private Retirement Systems
Having reviewed some of the key institutional features of retirement systems, it remains to
address the overall rationales for public versus private plans more generally. This section reviews
seVeralimportant motivations for the different pillars of a multiple-pillar system. Depending on a
country's needs and abilities, one or another mix may be more appropriate. Since retirement
systems offer retirement insurance, it is important to ask how the insurance varies with
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characteristics of the groupbeing covered,the natureof the benefitsbeingprovided.and the
funding mechanisms used to pay for the coverage.
Group characteristics matter for the adverse selection prob1m. which arises because
individuals will always have better "private" information about their health and their life
expectancies. than will an external business or government agent. A retirement plan that pennits
members to enter and leave voluntarily will suffer from adverse selection. because those who
expect to have a short life expectancy leave. and those who expect to live a long time in retirement
will remain. As a result voluntary group plans will either be forced to charge higher rates as a
result of this unbalancing of the risk pool. or may simply fail to develop.22 In contrast. making a
retirement plan universal spreads the risk across the larger population and avoids this form of
adverse selection.23 Of course. strictly sPeaking. this explains why many retirement systems are
mandatory. but does not necessarily entail public provision of the plan. Private or family
provision of retirement income support may be less subject to this type of adverse selection as
compared to worker groups. to the extent that membership in the family is not voluntary (Kotlikoff
and Spivak 1981).
Moral hazard arises in a number of forms in retirement plans. One aspect has to do with
retirement decisions: many retirement plans pay benefits only after withdrawal from the labor
market. and especially in public plans. pay benefits according to a redistributive formula. Thus for
example the Japanese government provides a two-tier social security system, with the flISt tier
consisting of a uniform flat benefit for all citizens. Similar plans. though offering different
guarantee levels, are available in many other developed countries as well. Offering a flat benefit
raises the possibility that some persons able to work will instead retire sooner than they would
otherwise. A discussion of empirical evidence on this point is left to the next section; nevertheless.
it seems likely that types of benefit plans would be less susceptible to moral hazard than others.
For instance. a pure defined contribution plan avoids this problem by fully adjusting benefits so as
to make the worker's pension wealth constant irrespective of his or her retirement age. Also. when
retirees must rely on family members to care for them, they may tend to work longer instead of
imposing on their families and/or reducing their likely bequests.24
Another factor motivating public intervention in retirement systems relies on externalities.
For example. some taxpayers may suffer externalities when other people fail to insure themselves
against old-age poverty. and taxpayers must support them. This argument has been offered when
elderly wind up without medical care. nursing home care. or adequate housing. In this case. it has
been argued that government intervention is required in the establishment of a mandatory retirement
income system into which all must pay, and from which all may benefit at least at a minimum level
of support. What remains less clear is whether government provision of the benefit itself is
Page 20 -Olivia S. Mitchell
justified. In other words, this market failure may require private market regulation to force
provision, but may not necessarily require that the government s~ould take on the task of providing
the full benefit 2S
.
An additional concern in the debate over whether retirement plans should be public or
private is the worry that private retirement schemes are intrinsically unable to protect against certain
types of macroeconomic risk. For example, even when private capital markets are well
established, the risk of inflation remains one which is impossible to insure against completely in
the private market (Bodie 1990; Pesando 1991). Hence private pensions cannot guarantee constant
real retirement consumption streams, a failure which seriously undermines confidence in private
pension benefit systems, and thus is especially troubling in countries with high inflation histories.
Added to this is the concern over undiversifiable capital market risk of other types, which only the
national government can offer partial protection against. In the U.S. for example, the capital
market crash of the 19308destroyed both jobs and private pension savings, and is often cited as a
primary motivation for publicly provided pensions. On the other hand, public pension plans do
nOtguarantee constant real benefit values either, since recent history shows that their assets and
oftentimes their benefit payments can be subject to fiscal pressure and political manipulation.
Thus the vaunted greater stability of public plans given macroeconomic variation may be, in fact,
nOtmuch superior to that of private plans (Mitchell and Smith forthcoming).
Credible long-tenn real pension promises do appear to require some fonn of government
intervention, though the particular fonn this takes varies widely across countries. One method
which stops short of complete government takeover of the system, is to encourage the creation of
private plans with some ~ovemment insurance against macroeconomic shocks. Private sector
pension plans are permitted to purchase real government-backed secmities in the U.K. and in
Canada for example, a practice which has been hailed as increasing retirement secmity without a
fully nationalized system (Munnell and Grolnic 1986). In the U.S., defmed benefit pensions
offered though the private sector are required to participate in a government-run mandatOI)' pension
insurance plan, which protects beneficiaries against partial loss of benefits in the eventuality of
company bankruptcy (Ippolito 1989). Partial government insurance for privately-run pension
plans is also provided in Chile, though the government has sought to "privatize" the national social
security retirement plan as a whole (Diamond 1992; Bodie and Merton 1992; Marcel and Arenas
1992; Merton and Bodie 1992).
Despite the appeal of government pension insurance, some concerns should be noted. First
is the problem that government pension insurance is still relatively new, and the economic features
of these insurance programs have yet to be fully worked out. Pricing government insurance so as
to reflect the true cost of coverage, without driving private plans and/or the government insurer out
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of business, has proven elusive and thus far has required considerable subsidies from the public
sector (Ippolito 1989; Bodie 1992). A related problem is that government guarantees regarding
future pension promises require that the public be confident of long-term political and economic
stability. Whether and to what extent retirement systems in developing and developed countries
can keep the promises made to future generations despite serious demographic pressures is, as yet,
unknown.
In addition to market failure motivations for public intervention in retirement systems,
many feel that eq}Jityconsiderations are an important factor explaining why both public and private
pensions co-exist in a multiple pillar retirement system. Public social security programs are
frequently used to provide guaranteed income floors under those who are economically vulnerable
and unable to sustain themselves due to infirmity, lack of job skills, or other problems. Minimum
income insurance is often seen as a government responsibility, inasmuch as only a government can
exert the necessary taxing authority to finance widespread income suppon programs.
It should be emphasized, however, that the redistributive rationale does not necessarily
mandate that old-age insurance should be public. Thus in some countries, most notably in pans of
Africa and Asia, older persons are virtually completely privately supported by family members, by
religious and community groups, and/or charity (Deaton and Paxson, 1992). Also, there is at least
the potential for private purchase of insurance by younger workers, against likely events
threatening consumption patterns when they are old, such as nursing home insurance. (It should
be noted that adverse selection and moral hazard problems seem sufficiently severe that these
instruments have not developed very widely even in the United States.) In any event, the equity
motivation for old age benefit plans requires that an individual or group identify a living standard
against which older peoples' resources are compared, and provide a means to achieve affordable
insurance. Policymakers often disagree over the proper equity Standard. making it difficult to
compare retirement systems in some cases. In addition it is widely held that young workers
underestimate their future needs, either as a result of poor information or systematic InYa,pia.and
as a result should be forced to purchase more insurance for paternalistic reasons.26
Before leaving the discussion over public versus private provision of retirement income, it
must be noted that retirement systems are often criticized for two other reasons as well: because of
administrative inefficiencies, and because of inadequate integration. Administrative inefficiencies
in public systems were recently highlighted in a study of several Latin American public pension
funds; that report concluded that most public plans reported negative rates of return during the
decade of the 19808, and devoted excessive funds to bureaucratic management (Mesa-Lago 1989,
1990). This problem is not limited to Latin American public plans; a recent study of U.S. private
pensions found that rates of return earned were below market rates earned by diversified mutUal
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fund portfolios (McCarthy and Turner 1989). It has also been reponed that record-keeping is
problematic in many Eastern European and Latin American pension systems, particularly when
they lack modem computers and computer software to keep track of contributions and assets.27
Similar bookkeeping difficulties in Eastern Europe make it virtually impossible to compute
governmental liability for long-term benefit promises. This is obviously a matter of much concern
to the governments and to lending institutions, since retirement system promises are a fonn of
national debt which affects a country's economic health. Data collection and processing problems
are not limited to public plans; indeed. computerized record-keeping and analysis of privately
sponsored pensions has been possible in only the last half decade in the United States.
An administrative problem just beginning to be understood in the early 1990s is the fact that
in many countries,privateandpublic sectorplansaffectingretirementare often not well inte~ted, .
and sometimes have unforeseen and complex overlaps between the separate components. As noted
above, many European nations and some others as well offer a diversity of pathways to retirement,
including partial retirement, flexible retirement, disability and unemployment coverage. These are
generally managed through distinct agencies which do not necessarily communicate and integrate
benefits in a coherent form. This generates problems of sometimes unforeseen overlaps between
different components of the many plans, and makes an assessment and overhaul of the system
complex. In addition, as the international labor force becomes increasing mobile with trade
agreements fashioned in Western Europe and the Americas, lack of retirement system integration
will create barriers to labor that may become increasingly problematic.
In addition to the other rationales offered for public versus private retirement plans, it
should be noted that retirement systems are not simply neutral players in an economic system.
Instead, analysts have argued that they can have quite different effects in labor and capital markets,
and generate $PilJoverswith vastly different consequences for overall economy-wide equity and
efficiency.
C. Economi,tJ:ffects of~lIar Retirement Systems
Many questions remain about the economic effects of retirement systems on labor and
capital markets, though some conclusions are drawn out in this section. In terms of labor market
effects, there is evidence that early retirement incentives contributed to the trend toward earlier
retirement both in the developed countries, and in some developing countries. This is because
relatively generous benefits are relatively easier to get, and because employers under stress have
found high payroll tax rates a disincentive to employment It is not yet known whether early
retirement offerings reduce overall unemployment rates and open up job oPJ><rtW1itiesfm-younger
workers that otherwise would not have developed, though there is good reason to suspect they do
not Early retirement plans are an expensive long-term subsidy to relatively young persons, which
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in the long run will require imposing higher taxes. Most likely, less expensive, shoner-term
programs with fewer work disincentives could be designed to attack unemployment, while
. .
reducing income insecurity among the poor. .
In terms of capital market effects, the literature suggests that underfunded public pension
systems do not appear to massively depress private savings, though they certainly do not seem to
increase it. Fully funded private pensions in the United States apparently increase capital formation
modestly, though it is not clear whether this positive effect carnes over to developing economies
with less extensive capital markets. It has also been alleged that private pension plan growth can
generate healthier capital markets, though pension plans in the developing countries examined here
have thus far fallen shon of spUITingmassive new private savings.
Retirement Systems' Labor Market Effects
Retirement systems provide old-age income, and some might think that their main labor
market effects would therefore be limited to the end of the worklife. Indeed, retirement plans do
exen a powerful effect on workers' choice of retirement age. In addition, however, retirement
systems affect a myriad of labor supply decisions made by younger and middle-aged workers as
well, depending on the way the benefit formulas are structured, and also depending on the way
benefits are financed. Effects of retirement systems on labor demand are also important and
varied. In the case of a voluntarily-supplied company pension plan, the retirement promise is an
integral part of the firm's compensation package; hence pension financing and benefit formulas are
endogenously determined with labor demand, and not external to it Governmental social security
systems also have important effects on labor demand, especially when they cover only portions of
the workplace, are supponed by payroll taxes making covered workers relatively expensive, and
when they offer benefits which favor early retirement. These effects are sketched in this review of
how retirement systems affect labor markets.
Retirement Systems and Lobor Supply: A great deal of microeconomic research
during the 1980s examined the effects of retirement systems on retirement behavior.28
Specifically, studies have shown that workers with generous pensions retire earlier than those with
lower pension benefits. Also, workers offered more money to delay retirement tend to do so. In
both cases, these responses are statistically significant, but small. For example in the United
States, a 10 percent increase in the present value of total retirement income at age 60 has been
found to induce earlier retirement by only about 1-2 months, and a 10 percent income increase for
deferring retirement induces later retirement by 1-4 months (Fields and Mitchell 1984a).29 What
this implies is that the generous early retirement benefits made available throughout most of the
developed countties during the decade of the 1980s contributed to the declining labor supply of
older workers, though they probably do not explain the entire downward trend.30 One
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phenomenon which deserves more research in the next decade is how uncertainty affects retirement
patterns. For instance when inflation threatens a benefit promise, or when plans become unstable
due to underfunding, retirement behavior is forced to adapt and retirement dates must be
readjusted. Too little is known about these causes and consequences of such adaptations, and
more research on these reactions is needed.
Retirement systems influence not only older workers' labor supply; they also influence
labor supply by younger employees as well. One effect is a deterrent to mobility, which may be
explained by pension plan rules requiring long service before vesting, plans' failing to protect
against inflation the benefits of job-leavers, and in the case of defmed benefit plans, formulas
which defer benefit accruals until late in an employee's worklife. The facts are clear: workers with
employer-supplied private pensions change jobs only half as often as workers without pensions}l
Whether reduced turnover is deemed socially desirable depends on whether more stable employees
are more productive, and there is some suggestion that they may be.32
Young and middle aged workers' behavior may be influenced by retirement system rules in
other ways as well, because of complex benefit accrual patterns. Thus in the United States, for
instance, earnings below a ceiling are credited toward the social security pension, and hence are
subject to payroll tax, but earnings above this are neither credited toward benefits, nor taxed. This
tax system is combined with a redistributive benefit fonnula, so that highly-paid workers have an
incentive to concentrate work and earnings during narrower segments of the worldife, so as to
reduce their tax burden, than would be true otherwise. As yet there has been little research on the
question of whether workers fully understand complex retirement system rules, and how flexibly
they can reallocate work so as to maximize net pension returns over their lifetimes, as well as
toward the end of the worklife.33 This too remains a topic for additional research.
Retirement Systems and Labor Demand: Studies of retirement systems recognize
that such systems can influence the demand for labor in important ways. The negative effect of
high payroll taxes on labor demand is a concern in many nations. Payroll tax rates for public
pensions in Latin America range from over SOpercent of the wage base in Brazil, and 28 percent
Paraguay. Payroll tax rates of 50 percent are not uncommon in the Eastern European and former
Soviet nations, while France and Gennany impose rates closer to 20 percent for their public plans
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1990; Atkins 1991). Rates such as these added
to labor costs depress the demand for labor, which in turn reduces wages and employment In
Iddition, to the extent that payroll taxes are seen as fixed costs of employment, firms hire fewer
WOlken, each of whom works longer hours, rather than spreading the now-smaller overall
employment across more employees.
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Many economic studies have sought to pinpoint the precise magnitude of these payroll tax
effects on labor market outcomes. with mixed results due to data constraints (DiInot 1991;
Hamermesh 1993; Hart 1984). Theoretical models indicate that p~yroll taxes affect wages and
employment depending on how flexibly labor is supplied to the market. and on employers' labor
demand elasticities. While no single set of empirical results is commonly accepted. Hamermesh
(1993) suggests that in developed countries. the burden of the payroll tax falls primarily and almost
completely on labor. rather than consumers or producers. Specifically. higher payroll taxes are
apparently fully translated into reduced wages. with relatively little disemployment effect, among
adult male manufacturing full-time workers in industrialized economies where payroll tax coverage
is vinually universal.
In the nonindustrialized countries. lack of data and special labor market features have
made it difficult for researchers to produce useful estimates of the effects of retirement systems'
payroll tax.34 Depending on the country. workers may have options outside of the economic sector
subject to payroll taxes. labor demand elasticities may vary greatly across sectors. and minimum
wage laws may restrict wage declines. Each of these factors makes it far more complex to estimate
payroll tax effects. For example. in some developing countries. the existence of an informal and/or
rorallabor market permits workers escaping the taxed sector to find employment, albeit at lower
pay. This can mitigate the disemployment effect produced by the payroll tax in the covered sector.
but may also increase earnings inequality. In many developing countries there is also widespread
tax evasion, an institutional reality which is likely to caITyover to some of the economies in
transition as well. For instance, in Argentina. where the social security tax rate is 50 percent, one-
third of tax revenue is apparently not collected; this finding led McGreevey (1990) to suggest that
social security revenues might actually increase if the payroll tax rate were lowered Alternatively.
if retirement systems were fmanced by more general revenue instead of payroll taxes. there could
be fewer negative labor market consequences for employment and wages. More research is
urgently needed on the consequences of payroll taxes for wages and employment in the developing
country contexl
Other ways in which national retirement systems shape the demand for labor should also be
mentioned. Firms' compensation and pension offerings are thought to be responsive to
government labor market and tax policy, as well as government-sponsored retirement benefits.
Higher and more secure benefit promises from public plans permit employers to worry Jess about
company-sponsored retirement saving. which offers additional latitude within which pay packages
can be designed. Hence changes in tax and retirement policy can have direct and potent effects on
worker pay, turnover and retirement patterns, and productivity more generally. It is fair to say that
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these effects have not been the subject of sufficient study, and are a vital research need in the
decade to come (Gustman et al. 1992).
Retirement Systems, Unemployment, and Income" Security: It is widely
contended that early retirement benefits in the developed countries devised during the 19805 are a
response to a persistent unemployment problem. As one viewer put it, "those who fear
unemployment (especially youth unemployment...) argue for a consciously oriented 'exchange of
the generations' in the labor market...[which] is both legally and socially more acceptable and
cheaper than introducing a decent scheme of unemployment benefits" (Szalai 1992). A natural
follow-up question is whether in fact the policy shift toward earlier retirement reduced
unemployment rates, and whether it was more acceptable, and cheaper, than various policy
alternatives.
No satisfactory answer to this fundamentally important policy question yet exists, and it
should be high priority to undertake this research. Initial explorations demonstrate that it is
difficult to compare unemployment defmitions, and early retirement programs, across nations. In
Britain, for example, when older men receiving unemployment payments were no longer required
to register as unemployed, official unemployment rates dropped by half, from 19.7 percent in
1982, to 9.6 percent in 1983 (Laczko and Phillipson 1991). A similar result prevailed in West
Germany, after persons age 58 and older were no longer required to register in order to receive
unemployment subsidies. Certainly it can be said that these early retirement schemes were
"successful" in reducing unemployment, but by redefining unemployment rather than by raising
employment levels. In other countries, older workers in training programs or in sheltered
employment are variously included or excluded from the unemployment count, which in turn
affects estimated official unemployment rates (Piachaud 1986).
The key issue is clearly not how to design early retirement plans which through defmition
changes reduce official unemployment rates. Rather, the important question is whether early
retirement plans adopted during the 1980s ultimately produced healthier labor markets and more
growth than would have occUlTedotherwise, while easing the transition process.
In order to answer this query, it is necessary to formulate a counterfactual, characterizing
what would have happened if the early retirement offerings had not been implemented. Job
markets in the early 19805 were not particularly strong for any age groups in most countries, and
older persons suffered from relatively high unemployment rates as well as longer spells of
~loyment. Since most unemployed older people tend to move out of the labor force rather
than seek new jobs, the early retirement benefits probably provided an income cushion for many
persons who were on their way out of the work world anyway. Qearly many of the older
unemployed had little chance of becoming re-employed; in Great Britain, for example, only 60
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percent of women age 50-59 receiving unemployment benefits actually sought jobs (Laczko and
Phillipson 1991; OECD 1990).
Before taking this as evidence that the programs succeeded. one must ask whether older
workers such as these might have reentered the labor force without the early-out benefits, and what
the economic consequences of offering the benefits were. Surprisingly little research has explored
this question. Layard et al. (1991: 566) compare unemployment trends and the growth of early
retirement across many developed nations, and conclude that "the countries that have experienced
more early retirement (often encouraged by government policy) are those with the biggest rise in
unemployment" The direction of the causal relationship was not explored in that study. Certainly
this question should be a high priority research topic for policymakers in the retirement arena.
One topic that no one has devoted much attention to is the question of whether continued
work might have been an option for many early retirees, since they were quite young (many in
their 50s) and probably in no worse health than previous generations which worked far longer.
Had this cohort remained in the labor force, it might have exerted downward pressure on wages by
swelling the ranks of those seeking jobs. To the extent that wage rigidity has been identified as a
major cause of unemployment, it is at least possible that early retirement schemes could have
actually raised rather than lowered overall joblessness, by permitting high and rigid wages to
remain in effect longer. Indeed in West Germany, older women's and men's unemployment rates
were three to five times higher in 1989, as compared to 1977.35 What they would have been
without the programs is uncertain.
A related question is whether youn&erworkers' labor market options would have been
markedly worse, had the early retirement options not been in effect More evidence on this point is
needed, but there is reason for skepticism. An early-out policy which reduces the supply of older
workers can improve demand for younger workers only when the two age groups are substitutes
in production, and this has not been demonstrated. A study of substitution between different age
groups of workers using data from the United States concluded that 1) within a given gender
group, workers from different age groups are complementary (with the exception of teenagers);
and 2) most substitution occurs across gender for different age categories (Levine and Mitchell
1988). While other approaches to measuring substitution should be investigated with data for
more countries, there is certainly no a priori reason to expect that forcing workers in their 50s to
retire automatically opens up job possibilities for younger employees. In addition, of course, if
~
recognizes that early retirement plans increase current and future tax burdens on younger
workers, there is no clear-cut presumption that early-out programs are cheaper in the long run than
the alternative. Indeed it is at least plausible that shorter tenn commitments to persons in their 50s
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would have been less expensive, given that early retirement pensions frequently entail huge
subsidies which must be met by higher future taxes.
It is also important to address the question of whether reUreJDCntsystems reduce old-age
income insecurity, particularly in difficult economic times. Of course, answers VaIy from one
country to the next, depending on actual coverage rates of the working population (e.g. in
Honduras less than 20 percent of the population has social security coverage, whereas in many
Western European nations coverage is virtually universal), what types of benefits are provided
(e.g. whether benefits are mainly of the flat type, or whether benefits more insurance-oriented by
being tied to preretirement pay), and other institutional features of the benefits including whether
they are indexed. Social security systems the world over have the potential to reduce poverty, and
many have done quite well (see Andrews 1990; Mitchell 1992; Pestieau 1991; and Young 1991
among others). On the other hand, some appear to be biased against the poor, as noted by Grosh
(1990), who concluded that pension and disability programs in Latin America favor the more
highly paid primary sector workers, after accounting for both taxes paid and benefits received. In
addition, early retirees also tend to more heavily subsidized than most, since they pay into the
system for a much shorter period yet live longer, all the while receiving benefits which exceed the
amounts they would have received at the regular retirement date. Too, as McGreevey (1990) adds,
the elderly are not of necessity those who most require income supplementation.
For these reasons, serious questions remain about how effectively early retirement plans
were in shielding from poverty older persons at risk of low income during the decade of the 1980s,
and how target-efficient the systems were in concentrating limited funds on the most needy. Of
even more policy concern is the question of how vulnerable future generations of retirees will be to
future retirement benefit cuts. Many eminent analysts have expressed profound concern about the
likelihood of such retirement system benefit reductions, based primarily on their gloomy
assessment of anticipated fiscal pressures paired with the rapid growth of the aging population
{Marchand and Pestieau 1991). It will be critically important to track, and COITeCtwhere possible,
changes in retirement systems which force older persons into poverty. This is a high priority
research need in the next decade.
~ital Market Effects of Retirement Systems
Analysts concerned with the effects of retirement systems on capital markets generally ask
whether retirement programs increase savings, and if so, whether these retirement plans can be
used to generate new capital for growth.
Many authors have argued over the years that public retirement systems, particularly
unfunded ones, "crowd out" and thereby reduce, private saving.36 This pessimistic assessment
rests on the argument that social security promises replace saving that people would otherwise
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engage in on their own, to protect against the possibility of old-age poveny. Particularly when an
unfunded social security system is first started, benefits are grante;dto older persons in excess of
their contributions. Hence the transition generations receive subsidies from future cohorts and
accordingly have the incentive to save less privately, to offset their greater wealth offered through
the public plan. Opponents of the thesis have argued that social security payments will not alter
savings, since publicly-supplied benefits simply substitute for intergenerational transfers that
would have occurred via private conduits. These contradictory views of the predicted effects of
public pension systems, and others involving possible rearrangement of work effort over the
lifetime, imply that there is no a priori theoretical relationship between public pensions and private
savings levels.
Because theory is ambiguous, empirical evidence is'required on whether public retirement
plans reduce savings, in practice. Some authors do find negative effects, but many others
conclude with Kotlikoff that "the findings lend little support to the notion that social security has
reduced the capital stock" (Kotlikoff 1979: 409). Certainly there is no conclusive evidence that
public benefits trade off one-for-one with private savings in developed countries, nor is there any
apparent positive effect of public plans on savings.37 There is very little evidence on this point
from developing countries.
Turning to the question of whether private pensions affect savings, again theory offers little
clear evidence. For instance, if fully funded private pensions are perfect substitutes for
nonpension private saving, monies invested in these pensions would offset nonpension saving
one-for-one. However, some workers covered by pension plans are likely to save more than they
would have otherwise, due to myopia or inadequate infonnation; in this instance, pensions could
increase savings. Tax preferences in many countries also alter the terms of trade between pension
and other savings instruments, making it clear that net effects will depend on specific institutional
structures in each country. Adding leavening to this discussion is the recent suggestion that capital
markets may be quite local in nature, so that commercial loans are sensibly provided by locally-
operated, well-infonned financial organizations. (This was concluded in the United States, though
studies elsewhere remain to be conducted; see Hannan 1991). Perhaps private pension fund capital
can beneficially add to supplies of local capital, and take advantage of investment opportunities,
that otherwise would not be noted by outside investors.
Empirical studies on private pensions are modestly optimistic, though here too there are a
variety of estimates (Munnell and Yohn 1992). In the United States, analysts tend to find that
another dollar of private pension benefits reduces nonpension private savings by 70 cents; on net
then, additional private pension wealth appears to increase capital formation, by 30 cents on the
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dollar. It is not yet known if this small positive effect carries over to other countries. particularly
developing economies with much less extensive capital markets.
Irrespective of whether new capital is generated. it is still possible that private pensions can
channel existing savings to promote equity and bond markets often absent in developing countries.
and for this reason policymakers sometimes favor private over public pensions. Unfortunately this
preference begs the question of whether developing countries lack funds for truly worthwhile
private investments which somehow international investors fail to perceive. or whether capital
markets are absent because domestic projects are insufficiently attractive to compete for available
funds on the international capital market (Zollner 1991).
In any event. private savings plans can alter the composition of national savings if they
change savers' asset risk/return portfolios. In Poland. for example. pensions have been nominated
to hold commercial paper generated by newly-privatized firms. Oearly. forcing pensions to
concentrate investments in domestic firms of questionable profitability imposes nondiversified
risks on pensioners' shoulders, with the possibility of high (or no) return. This pension portfolio
differs substantially from a diverse set of international holdings hedged against regional risk.
exchange rate and inflation risk, and other more local concerns (Diamond 1992; Bodie and Merton
1992; and Boswell and Granato 1992). It is unlikely that workers will feel as secure about these
plans as they would about their previous claims against public retirement plan benefits. Another
case in point is the Chilean system. seen by many as the most successful reform in this regard,
since the underfunded social security system was replaced by a mandatory private defined
contribution plan system To date however, it is not clear that that this changeover will produce net
new domestic private savings, because pension holdings until recently have been restricted mainly
to government debt
In sum, in the early stages of economic transformation. private pension plan asset
composition may differ little from that of public plans, and consequently may have little immediate
positive effects on capital markets. In the longer run, perhaps. pensions can certainly participate
in capital market growth. The evidence suggests, however. that private pension plans may not be
the "engine of growth" desired by many. though they may contribute modestly.
D. Lessons and Research Needs
Many nations have expensive and complex multiple pillar retirement programs. The need
to provide income security in old age will continue to grow in years to come - workers in many
nations have grown accustomed to increasingly early retirement. the aging population is
expanding, longevity continues to increase in most countries. and the family is DOlonger a
primary source of old-age support. At the same time. many countries confront impending crises in
their public retirement plans since they face dwindling tax bases due to recession. labor force
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shrinkage, and industrial restructuring, and are reluctant to increase already-high payroll tax rates.
During the 1990s the challenge will be to redesign multiple-pillar retirement systems to as to ensure
continued old-age economic security, while reducing the depressive effects of retirement systems
on labor and capital markets.
Retirement systems are commanding increasing attention ftom development analysts
seeking to restructure country economies with an eye toward growth. Policy analysts interested in
integrating retirement system reform with other aspects of country fiscal and financial reform
should be aware of the following guidelines and lessons.
Guidelines and Lessons
-Developing and developed countries are increasingly turning to two-tier benefit plans.
Often the first tier is formulated to deliver a minimum welfare benefit, sometimes means tested and
funded out of general revenue. A second tier is usually geared toward replacing a portion of pre-
retirement pay, and may be privately financed (though often some form of government insmance is
offered). Cleaner separation of the two tiers may become increasingly important for better-targeted
social safety net poverty reduction programs.
-Many developing economies have not fonnally valued, nor recognized, retirement system
promises. Development agencies can help devise methods of measuring these long-term debts, in
order to determine how these will affect long term economic planning and growth.
-Governments are only beginning to recognize that high payroll taxes as a means of
financing retirement benefits have undesirable efficiency and equity consequences. This is
particularly a problem when these benefits favor relatively well-off young retirees, and when tax
evasion is widespread.
-There is no evidence that the Western economies are better off by having heavily
subsidized retirement for workers in their 50s. Furthermore, generous early retirement benefits
promised in the last decade will carry large and long-term costs. An emerging lesson is that
retirement systems are not well-suited to solve unemployment problems.
-Many developing countries need to computerize retirement system data on workers and
retirees. Systems are also required to computerize financial data, track fund inflows, outflows,
investment returns, and so forth. Development agencies can help with this task, installing
computers and creating software to track earnings and payroll taxes paid, as well as benefit
eligibility and benefit payouts, along the way offering technical assistance on accounting and
administrative efficiency standards.
-Many industrializing economies are in need of improved fmancial systems which
development agencies are in the process of providing. It will be important to incorporate retirement
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system refonns in the course of fonnulating technical assistance plans, since in many cases a
perceived need for private pension plans will interact with capital market development strategies.
.
-Along with assistance establishing better financial systems, developing countries are
finding it necessary to codify law and property rights so as to clarify conditions of capital
ownership. It is crucial to include retirement savings instruments in the process, so that
individuals, companies, and the government will better understand the risk/return characteristics of
different retirement savings components.
Research Needs
A fundamental obstacle to better retirement policy is the lack of data on the economic effects
of retirement systems on labor and capital markets. Greatly needed in the developing countries are
household living surveys indicating the economic activity and well-being of workers and retired
persons. Perhaps even more critical is the need for employer-side surveys which can illustrate
how retirement system taxes and benefits affect labor demand. Sample surveys will probably be
required to fill both objectives. Finally, but equally important, better databases should be
developed on the institutional features of and interactions within multiple-pillar retirement systems,
and the ways in which the private and public systems interact. Infonnation of this type will be of
great help to policymakers setting the agenda for retirement system refonn in the next century.
Research subjects deserving of particular attention from retirement program analysts in the
decade to come include the following:
1. How do the institutional components of retirement systems work? Better information is
required on the complex multiple-pillar systems shaping retirement behavior around the world,
including data on tax evasion, public and private plan benefit integration, and resulting income
distribution outcomes.
2. How do older workers respond to the incentives embedded in retirement systems? Better data
are required to evaluate behavioral responses to benefit instability due to uncertainty, inflation,
underfunding, and political instability. Also more research is required on worker understanding of
retirement system rules. Are early retirement subsidies more acceptable, and cheaper, than other
policy alternatives -- especially with the tax burden is recognized?
3. How does the demand for labor respond to retirement system provisions? Better data are
n=ied to devise improved models of labor demand, which take into account retirement options
and payroll taxes. In particular, it will be useful to obtain measures of labor demand elasticities for
developing countries, taking into account covered and uncovered sections, minimum wages, and
other institutional realities.
4. How do the retirement systems themselves respond to political, demographic, and economic
pressure? Under what circumstances can they keep, or will they break. promises made to cUlTCnt
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and future retirees? How do specific benefit offerings alter old-age economic insecurity and overall
income redistribution?
S. When can private retirement systems have desirable effects on:savings and investment in
developing countries with incipient capital markets? This requires asking whether developing
countries lack funds for truly worthwhile private investments which somehow international
investors fail to perceive, or whether capital markets are absent because domestic projects are
insufficiently attractive to compete for available funds on the international capital market
As the developed and developing nations move into the next century, some countries may
not be able to maintain retirement promises made to older persons. It will become increasingly
expensive to maintain systems which provide relatively young worlcers strong incentives to retire
early, either through regular early retirement benefits, or a variety of other early-out pathways
including disability and unemployment benefit options. Given these predictable fiscal stresses, it
seems prudent to begin discussion of alternative approaches to retirement system overhaul. Such
discussions may indicate which sequence of policy changes in taxes and benefits over time can best
smooth labor and capital market adjustments. A deliberate approach surely seems more sensible
than the alternative of doing nothing now, and then being forced to impose massive benefit cuts
when the aging workforce retires. Even with this tack, however, the fiscal problems confronting
some retirement systems are so immediate that they will require more immediate attention.
What are the hallmarks of retirement systems that work well? It seems clear that a healthy
retirement system would be judged as efficient, fair, and fiscally sound. And most policymakers
would agree that poorly functioning retirement systems are those plagued by inefficiency and
fraud, with inequity in the distribution of benefits and taxes, and fiscally unsound, possibly on the
verge on financial ruin. Unfortunately the real world offers many examples of poorly functioning
retirement systems, and few if any represent a "gold standard". Nevertheless, specifying reform
goals is helpful in order to determine what is likely to be beneficial, and what is not Using high-
cost long-term retirement systems to mitigate shott- and medium-term unemployment problems
will prove costly and inefficient as a solution to problems faced by economies in transition.
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IThe 24 OECD nations are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada. Denmark, Ft$nd, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan. Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United StaleS.
2For a discussion of different defmitions of retirement see Fields and Mitchell (1984b). There is relatively liule
research on the nature of older persons'labor force flows; for an examination of United States data see Quinn et at.
(1990).
3Whether this long-tenn downward pattern in wOOt at older ages will persist throughout the next several decades is
unknown. There is emergent evidence that in the latter half of the 19805 the downward participation trend stabilized
and in some cases even slightly reversed itself in a few nations. See OECD (1991). In the United States, for
instance, labor force participation rates for mean age ~ in 1966 were 78%, they dropped 10 54% in 1988, and
then rose 10 55.5% in 1990. For men age 65+, the male LFPR rate in 1966 was 27%, which fell to 15.8% by 1985
and then rose to 16.4% by 1990 (Wlpublished data provided by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics). Nevertheless, it
is premature 10 determine whether this trend reflects business cycle conditions, whether it resulted from curtailed
tarly retirement policies, or whether it is part of a new long-run secular trend.
4See Szalai (1991). Without d.iscoWlting that evidence on differential life expectancies in HWlgary, it should be
DOled that the availability of disability and sickness benefits probably does increase the incidence of reporting of
illness, and reduces labor force participation rates, in at least some countties. For example Burkhauser (1993) points
out that high disability benefits and relatively lenient qualification standards conttibute 10 low work rates in Germany
and the Netherlands.
SFor instance, in the United States, 2S percent of early retirees and 12 percent of all retirees cited poor health as their
reason for retirement (Fields and Mitchell 1984b). Less information is available from other COWltries, though there
may be somewhat greater age discrimination (Kohli et al. 1991).
6See Mitchell (1988a) fa' evidence on accident patternS by age in the United States; there is no information on age
profiles of job-related illness. The data show that workers over age 6S are slightly more likely 10 become fatally
injured on the job than workers at younger ages.
70n morbidity trends see Baily (1987). More research is needed on this topic in other COWltties as well.
81n the United States, the government fU'Stprohibited finns from imposing mandatory retirement before age 65, then
raised it 10 age 70, and eventually prohibited mandatory retirement in virtually all occupations. Most private sectm'
employers are now prevented from using mandatory retirement; exempted groups are generally in the public see1m'
and include judges, police, pilots, and fuefighters. For a discussion of mandatory retirement policy, see Quinn et al.
(1990) and Gustman et al. (1992).
9For instance, a survey of United States retirees by the Commonwealth FWld (1990) found that many claimed they
were interested in employment
1000utchens (1993) found that more than one quarter of wOOters aged SO 10 59 had no job after displacement,
compared 10 about 16 percent for yoWlger WOOters. More older persons also dropped out of the labor fc:rce a' were
unemployed as compared 10 younger employees (about 35 percent versus around 25 percent).
11Levine and Mitchell (1988) explored this question using data from the United States. Mexe aoss-national
evidence on the question would be useful.
12-Jbe material in this paragraph is developed in more detail in Fields and Mi1chell (1984b).1be economic effects of
pensions described here apply primarily 10 men; women's responses are apparently weaker. See Pazzebon and
Mitchell (1989).
13For a discussion of actuarial reduction factors see McGill and Grubbs (1989). FigUreS givm in the text are
illustrative only, since life expectancy tables and discount rates must be specifically tailored 10 each population 10
dcItnnine actuarial neutrality.
14For a discussion of integration between public and private plans in the United States see Mitchell (1992). A nice
discussion of selected OECD countties' experiences is available in Di1not and Walker (1989), Kohli et aI. (1991) and
SdunIh1 (1989). Pension plan features are reviewed in Dailey and Turner (forthcoming), Turner and Beller (1992),
8Dd Turnez and Dailey (1991).
15ne average "baby boomer" will attain age 65 in the year 2011 in the United States. The timing of this pattern
will differ a great deal across countties, however, since the baby boom lasted only three years in Japan, as compared
to 15 years in the U.S. As a consequence, Japan will experience more rapid popul81ion aging than will the US and
Page 3S . Olivia S. Mitchell
most other Western nations. Developing counties are typically younger, with the median age of the population
likely 10 remain ten years younger (around age 30 by the year 2025) as compared 10 their more developed
counterparts (around age 40). See aarle (1991,1993). Projecting future labor force trends is complex, and is likely
10 be an area for fruitful future research. Levine (1993) discusses the United States experience. For information on
other countries see Esping-Andersen and Sonnnberger (1991), Pam pel and Weiss (1983), and ZweimaIler (1991).
16Space constraints restrict our discussion 10 retirement programs, 10 the exclusion of unemployment compensation,
beaJth and poverty benefit systems. Surveys of other social insurance systems are available in Atkinson (1987,
1989, 1991), Atkinson and Mickelwright (1991), Hamermesh (this volume), Holzmann (1991), and OECD (1991),
among others.
17It should be noted that most OECD nations, and many of the economies in transition, also have special and
distinct retirement systems fa special groups of workers including the military, public employees, miners, railway
workers, and so forth. Depending on the country, these special plans can offer much more generous benefits than the
schemes covering regular employees, and in many cases impose large and growing burdens on public budgets. A
complete discussion of these special programs is, however, beyond the purview of this paper.
1&Jbe relative importance of the extended family in caring fa older persons varies a great deal and over time. In the
United States, less than 10 percent of the elderly live with their children, and very few receive any direct income
support from their children (Kotlikoff 1992); by contrast, in Japan, still a large fraction of the elderly resides with
their children. The importance of other groups also varies internationally: labor unions have played a central role in
organizing and managing worker pension plans in most of Western Europe, for example. Other social groups at
times provide a source of shon tenn funds, as in the case of rotating savings and credit associations; however these
institutions probably do not offer long tenn retirement income security (Besley et ai, 1992).
19J:or discussion of the Chilean system see Baeza (1986), Baeza and Manubens (1988), Bodie and Merton (1992),
Cheyre (1991), Diamond (1992), Marcel and Arenas (1992), Myers (1985), and Wallich (1983).
20ntese investment restrictions are being liberalized slowly 10permit more diversefication.
21Fa example, Mesa-Lago (1991) found that several Latin American nations' Social Security potfolio pezformance
was quite poor during the 19808. Most experienced negative real rates of return, and in the case of the single
exception, Chile, the government was forced 10 bail out the funds in the early 19805 to forestall bank failure
(Marcel and Arenas 1992). This pattern clearly bodes ill for the funding stabls of public plans, which in principle
should seek 10 earn returns comparable 10 those of an internationally diversified portfolio. Bodie and Merton (1992)
offer an interesting discussion of how 10 attain this target while limiting capital flight for the case of Israel. Not
only have public pensions performed poorly in the last several years; private pension funds have recently been found
10 earn less than comparable private mutual funds, a phenomenon which has not yet been fully explained (McCarthy
and Turner 1989).
22Adverse selection is discussed by Bodie (1990) who notes that it has expensive consequences fa privately povided
~nsion plan premiums.
Mandating pensions can, however, have undesirable effects of other sons depending on how benefits and financing
Ire structured (Mitchell 1991a). For example, a pension plan fmanced by a payroll tax makes labor in the covezed
IeCIO' relatively more expensive, which ultimately depresses employmenL Also, an unfunded retirement plan may
reduce national savings. Section III evaluates such economic effects in more detail.
Urhe literature on bequests is extensive; see Hurd (1990).
25 Also there is likely 10 be a welfare loss from mandatory benefits even when private sector povidezs are used 10
deliver them. Whether the government should provide the benefit itself, or require that pivate sector entities offer it.
depends on one's assessment of how efficiently and equitably government agencies behave. This would require
Ittention to whether there are substantial scale economies (or diseconomies) in centtally managing one pension fund,
bow bureaucrats behave when awarded control over huge budgets with typically little adminisIrative ovmight, and
bow government agencies respond 10 interest and pressure groups. See Barr (1992) and Mitchell (19918) for 8
discussion of these and related public choice problems when government is the sole provider of retirement and other
benefits.
26z>irect evidence on this point is thin, and controversial. For example, most persons in the Uniltd States do not
bave pivate insurance covering old-age nursing home care, and many say they believe that the government provides
IUChcoverage. Whether lack of formal insurance coverage is sensible or not depends on bow one ISIeSSeSthe costs
and benefits of pivate insurance covezage; Pauly (1990) has recently argued that observed bebavior may be optimal
inasmuch as it makes extended families more likely to care for their elderly relatives. In the case of pensions, thC'Ze
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seems to be more agreement that workers tend to save too little, explaining why paternalistic employers and
!ovemments tend to require pensions. Empirical evidence on the latter point appears in the next section.
7See McGreevey (1990) and Grosh (1990) for a discussion of Latin American plans; among others, Atkbls (1991),
Diamond (1992) and Takahashi (1992) discuss Eastern European plan diffICulties.
28This discussion is taken from Gustman et aI. (1992).
~ responses have been estimated for males; women's retirement responses to economic factors may be
somewhat smaller (pozzebon and Mitchell 1989).
3Grhese conclusions are supported by a number of microeconomic retirement studies on the United States and
Canada. capably reviewed by Quinn et al. (1990). British retirement studies by Zabalza et al. (1980) using microdata
also tend to confum these conclusions. English-language journals offer fewer micro-data studies on retirement
patterns in other OECD countries; aggregate time-series studies include those by ZweimUller (1991) and others cited
in SectionI.
31Information in this paragraph derives from Gustman et aI. (1992).
3200 the other hand positive productivity effects of lower mobility due to pensions is difficult to fmd (Allen and
Clark 1987).
33m the United States, Mitchell (1988) found that many workers did not adequately perceive their private pension
plan benefit rules, and Bernheim (1988) reported that public social security retirement offerings were also widely
misunderstood. Information apparently improved as workers approached retirement age. The extent to which
workers reallocate labor across economic sectors, as well as labor and leisure over their lifetimes, deserves far more
Study, particularly in developing countries.
34m his literature review McGreevey (1990) refrains from drawing any conclusion about the size of the payroll tax
effect on the demand for labor. Hamermesh (1992) discusses and payroll tax incidence in the developing COW1try
context and concludes that more research on this topic is required before a consensus can be drawn.
3SOne study examined whether unemployment compensation benefits were used to smooth the path to early
retirement in the United States, and found little evidence in support of tile thesis (Hamermesh 1979).
36See Munnell (1986), Munnell and Ernsberger (1989), and Munnell and Yohn (1990), f<r a survey oftbeOOes and
empirical work in the area. The most well-known proponent of the view that social security reduces savings is
Feldstein (1976).
37There is also considerable controversy regarding the question of whether the demographic aging of the population
will increase <r decrease the demand for savings; see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1991), among others.
1960 1975 1980 1985
Australia 3.3 4.5 4.9 4.9C
Austria 9.6 12.5 13.5 14.5
Belgium N/A 10.5 11.9 N/A
Canada 2.8 3.7 4.4 5.4
Denmarlc 4.6 7.8 9.1 8.5
Finland 3.8 6.1 6.5 7.1c
France 6.0 10.1 11.5 12.7
Germany 9.7 12.6 12.1 11.8
Greece N/A 4.8 5.8 10.7
Iceland N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ireland 2.5 4.2 4.5 5.4
Ita!y 5.5 10.4 12.0 15.6
Japan 1.3 2.6 4.4 5.3
Luxembourg N/A N/A N/A N/A
Netherlands 4.0 8.9 11.0 10.5
New Zealand 4.3 5.3 7.6 8.1
Norway 3.1 8.0 7.9 8.OC
Portugal N/A 4.1 6.1 7.2
Spain N/A 4.3 7.3 8.6c
Sweden 4.4 7.7 10.9 11.2
Switzerland 2.3 7.7 8.0 8.1
Turkey N/A N/A N/A N/A
United Kingdom 4.0 6.0 6.3 6.7
United States 4.1 6.7 6.9 7.2
OECD averageb 4.3 7.1 8.2 8.9
Table 1.
Public Pension Expenditure as a Percent of GDP in OECD Nations8
~:
Nt A: data not available.
BRatio of annual public expenditure on pensions to current-year GDP. Public pensions include both transfers
through social programs and pension payments to retired government employees. Privately sponsaed pensions are
not included, nor are tax expenditures granted to private and/<r public plan savings.
boECD avenge represents the unweighted mean of available figures.
Cp'JgUreSare for 1984.
~:
OECD (1990),Table 7, p. 33, and author'scalculations. Figures for Germanyref« 10the former nationof West
Oennany.
Table 2: Labor Force Participation Rates (%)
of Older Workers in OECD Countries
Men Women
Connto' Age 55-64 Age 65+ Age 55-64 Age 65 +
Australia
1970 85.1 22.1 23.3 3.7
1975 78.8 16.7 23.7 3.9
1980 68.8 11.1 22.0 2.9
1985 60.4 8.9 19.3 2.0
1990 63.3 8.5 25.0 2.3
Austria.
1970 47.2 9.7 14.9 3.4
1975 36.8 7.0 13.0 2.8
1980 34.5 4.4 14.5 3.0
1985 19.1 3.7 8.7 1.6
1990 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Canada
1970 84.2 22.6 29.8 5.0
1975 79.4 18.5 30.8 5.0
1980 76.2 14.7 33.7 3.3
1985 70.2 12.3 33.8 4.2
1990 64.9 11.4 35.7 3.9
Finland
1970 71.1 19.0 46.3 4.4
1975 62.3 10.3 44.4 2.8
1980 57.3 17.0 43.0 6.0
1985 57.8 10.6 46.2 4.8
1990 45.4 7.9 39.7 2.9
France
1970 75.4 19.5 40.0 8.6
1975 68.9 13.9 35.9 5.8
1980 68.5 7.5 39.7 3.3
1985 50.1 5.3 31.0 2.2
1990. 45.8 3.7 31.3 1.5
Gennany
1970 82.2 19.9 29.9 6.5
1975 68.1 10.8 24.8 4.5
1980 65.5 7.0 27.2 3.1
1985 57.5 5.2 23.9 2.5
1990 N/A N/A N/A N/A
IrcJand
1970 91.0 44.0 21.3 11.3
1975 83.8 28.2 20.9 7.2
1980 79.1 23.7 19.5 4.8
1985 77.7 19.0 18.3 3.6
1990 N/A N/A NlA NlA
Table 2 (continued)
Men Women
Counby A~e 55-64 Age 65+ Age 55-64 Age 65 +
Italy. :
1970 48.2 12.9 10.6 2.6
1975 42.4 10.4 8.5 2.1
1980 39.6 12.6 11.0 3.5
1985 38.2 8.9 10.5 2.1
1990 35.9 8.0 10.1 2.2
Japan
1970 86.6 49.4 44.4 17.9
1975 86.0 44.4 43.7 15.3
1980 85.4 41.0 45.3 15.5
1985 83.0 37.0 45.3 15.5
1990 83.3 36.5 47.2 16.2
NethezJands
1970 80.8 11.4 14.9 2.3
1975 73.0 8.0 14.3 1.8
1980 63.6 4.8 14.3 0.9
1985 56.5 4.2 15.8 1.0
1990 45.7 N/A 16.7 N/A
Norway..
1970 N/A 58.7 N/A 24.9
1975 N/A 55.6 N/A 23.0
1980 N/A 53.3 N/A 24.7
1985 N/A 44.3 N/A 25.2
1990 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Portugal
1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A
1975 78.3 36.3 32.3 11.1
1980 75.0 27.8 32.0 8.6
1985 68.6 23.0 33.2 8.2
1990 66.9 20.0 32.5 7.8
Spain
1970 84.2 25.9 22.0 7.7
1975 79.8 18.8 23.0 6.3
1980 75.7 12.3 21.2 3.8
1985 66.3 5.9 20.0 2.1
1990 62.4 3.8 19.5 1.7
Sweden
1970 85.4 28.9 44.5 8.7
1975 82.0 19.9 49.1 6.1
1980 78.7 14.2 55.3 3.7
1985 76.0 11.0 59.9 3.2
1990 75.4 12.3 66.3 5.1
Table 2 (continued)
Men Women
Counby Age 55-64 Age 65+ Age 55-64 Age 65 +
United Kingdom
- 1970 91.3 20.2 39.3 6.4
1975 87.8 1S.8 40.3 4.9
1980 81.8 10.5 39.2 3.6
1985 66.4 7.6 34.1 3.2
1990 68.1 8.6 38.9 3.3
United States
1970 80.7 25.7 42.2 9.0
1975 74.6 20.7 40.7 7.8
1980 71.2 18.3 41.0 7.6
1985 67.3 15.2 41.7 6.8
1990 67.1 15.8 45.0 8.1
Notes 10TBbie 2:
N/A: data not available
. Age group is 60-64 for Italy and Austria
..Age group is 60 and over for Norway
~: OBeD (1990).
Data are not readily comparable for other OECD countries, including Belgium, Denmark. Greece, Iceland.
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Turkey. Figures listed under Germany are relevant to the
former nation of West Germany.
Table 3.
Labor Force Participation Rates of Older Workers,
Selected Economies in Transition
Men Women
Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age 65+ Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age65+
Bulgaria
(1985) 80.9 39.2 15.2 32.0 16.5 4.3
Czechoslovakia
(1980) 84.2 46.3 19.5 40.8 21.5 6.5
Hungary
(1980) 72.2 13.2 3.9 18.8 8.7 3.2
Poland
(1978) 81.5 62.4 34.9 57.9 37.4 19.4(1988) 72.0 53.6 32.5 50.6 34.3 19.0
Romania
(1977) 78.7 44.7 15.2 52.5 25.2 10.0
~:
OECD (1991), Table A.3, p. 17.
Table 4: Retimne'nt Ages In OECD Public and Private Pension Systems
Public Pension Systems Private Pension Systems
NormalRetirement. EarlyRetirement Ale. Men EarlyRetirement Ale. Women NormalRetirement ~e Ear\)' Retirement Aa:e
Coontn Men Women Low High Low High Men Women Men Women
Australia 65 60 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Auslria 65 60 55 60 50 55 65 60 N/A N/A
Belgium 65 60 55 64 55 55 65 60 60 55
Canada 65 65 60 64 60 64 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Denmark 67 67 60 66 60 66 67 62 60 60
Finland 65 65 60 64 60 64 65 65 55 55
France 60 60 55 60 55 60 60 60 55 55
Germ..y 65 65 58 63 58 63 65 65 N/A N/A
Greece 65 60 62 65 55 56 65 60 55 50
Iceland 67 67 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ireland 66 66 N/A N/A N/A N/A 65 65 50 SO
Italy 60 55 55 56 55 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A
JapID 65 65 60 64 60 64 60 60 N/A N/A
Luxembourg 65 65 60 60 60 60 65 60 N/A N/A
Nethcdands 65 65 60 62 60 62 65 65 N/A N/A
New Zealand 60 60 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Norway 67 67 N/A N/A N/A N/A 67 67 N/A N/A
,
Portugal 65 62 55 60 55 60 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Spain 65 65 64 64 64 64 65 65 N/A N/A
Sweden 65 65 60 64 60 64 65 65 55 55
Switzerland 65 62 N/A N/A N/A N/A 65 62 N/A N/A
Turkey 55 SO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Unitt'Jd JCin&dom 65 60 60 64 59 64 65 60 SO 50
Unitt'Jd StaIIeS 65 65 62 62 62 62 65 65 55 55
Man
All OECD 64.25 62..54 58.88 62.47 58.12 61.12 64.65 59.72 55 53.89
Europe 64.71 62.88 58.50 62.29 57.57 60.64 64.93 62.73 55 53.75
North America 65 65 61 63 61 63 65 65 55 55
Oceania 62.50 60 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Other 62.33 60.67 60 64 60 64 60 60 N/A N/A
Notes to Table 4:
N/A: data not available
. Financing figures refer to the fraction of the private pension contributions paid for directly by the
employer (Er) or the employee (Ee).
Sources: Data Appendix available on request Figures for Gennany refer'to the fonner nation of West
Gennany.
Table 5: Other Plan Characteristics of OECD Public and Private Pension Systems
Public Pension Systems Private Pension Systems
Rc,pJacement Ra1e (married) Eaminr:s ceilinr:* Financinr: ** Rc,placement Ra1e Financine *
Countty (% Non-ag. pay) (% Mfg. pay) Employer% Employee%
Austtalia 24 22.1 1 3 N/A 67 33
Austria N/A N/A 1 4 70 N/A N/A
Belgium 31.S 31.S 1 4 6S N/A N/A
ean.ta 44.1 37.8 1 6 N/A n 28
Denmark N/A 33 0 7 7S 67 33
Finland N/A 28.1 N/A 4 60 N/A N/A
France SO SO 1 S S7 60 40
Genn..y 68 685 1 4 SS 89 11
Greece N/A N/A N/A 4 80 N/A N/A
Iceland 28.S N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A
Ireland N/A 26.7 N/A 4 N/A N/A N/A
Italy N/A N/A N/A 4 S7 N/A N/A
Japan 3S.6 N/A N/A 1 SO 100 0
Luxembourg n.1 n.7 1 4 N/A N/A N/A
Netherlands 2S.1 275 0 10 N/A 74 26
New Zealand 29.6 30 N/A 3 N/A N/A N/A
Norway N/A SO.7 1 4 S2 N/A N/A
Ponugal N/A N/A 1 4 N/A N/A N/A'
Spain 30.7 31.6 1 4 7S N/A N/A
Sweden N/A 63.6 1 0 N/A 100 0
Switzerland 21.6 21.6 1 4 60 S8 42
Turkey N/A N/A 1 S N/A N/A N/A
Unittd Kinplom 2O.S 21.4 1 4 40 73 27
Unittd Stales 41.7 41.7 1 4 SS 87 13
Maa
All OECD 37.87 39.09 0.88 60.79 77 23
Europe 40.76 40.99 0.8S 62.17 74.43 2S57
North America 43.20 39.7S 1.00 SS 7950 20.S0
Oceania 26.80 26.0S 1.00 N/A 67 33
Other 32.0S N/A 1.00 SO 100 0
Notes to Tahle 5'
N/A: data not available
. Earnings ceiling used in computing tax base for payroll tax:
I=yes
0=00
.. F'mancing and contributions:
0 =government & employer
1 =employee only
2 =employer only
3 =government only
4 =alllhree
S = employee & employer only
6 =government universal pension; employee and employer: earnings related pension
7 =government & employee: universal pension; employee & employer: earnings related pension
10 =government & employee
Sources: Data Appendix available on request Figures listed under Germany refer 10 the former nation of
West Germany,
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